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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Anti-trust Laws-Borah-Van Nuys Act-Damages
In 1936, Congress undertook to strengthen Section 2 of the Clayton
Act, a federal anti-trust law designed to prohibit certain types of price
discrimination. Besides the Robinson-Patman Act, which divided Sec-
tion 2 into several amendments,' the revision resulted in the addition of
another section known as the Borah-Van Nuys Act.2 This latter amend-
ment has been described as a "grotesque manifestation of the scissors
and paste pot method of drafting a potentially drastic criminal statute."3
Like Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, it prohibits price and
service discriminations. Because of the difference in the language of
the statutes, however, conduct which is allowed under Section 2 of the
Robinson-Patman Act may be prohibited under the Borah-Van Nuys
Act. To illustrate, under the former Act a prerequisite to illegality is
two sales involving price discriminations, 4 whereas under the latter Act
a mere contract to make one sale is a violation.5
Perhaps it is because the Borah-Van Nuys Act expressly provides
criminal penalties for violations that early critics concluded that this sec-
tion imposed only a criminal liability on the violator.6 To date, however,
'38 STAT. 730, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
'15 U. S. C. § 13a (1946). It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any
transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge
against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any discount, rebate, allowance, or
advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any dis-
count, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available at the time of
such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of like grade,
quality, and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United
States at -prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United
States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in
such part of the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreason-
ably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a com-
petitor.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon con-
viction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
' Oppenheim, Should the Robinso n-Patman Act Be Amended? Robinson-
Patman Act Symposium, C. C. H. 141, 153 (1948).
It has been recommended that this Act be repealed. Oppenheim, Federal Anti-
trust Legislation: Guideposts To A Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH.
L. Ray. 1139, 1209 (1952).
'Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F. 2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939).
'A. J. Goodman and Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890
(D. Mass. 1949).
C "If section 3 were open to enforcement by private litigants, it wvould certainly
give rise to an enormous amount of harassing litigation. Fortunately section 3
seems to be drawn so that only the Government authorities can enforce it. ...
No means of enforcing Section 3 is expressly provided in the Robinson-Patman
Act except criminal actions by the Attorney-General. Except where such rights
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the Department of Justice has made little, if any, effort to enforce this
law, and, as yet, no alleged offender has suffered the authorized fine
or imprisonment.
By 1942, however, injured parties began seeking civil relief under
the Act, and in that year two suits involving damages were decided.
The Federal District Court of Texas, applying the damages provision
of the anti-trust laws to the Borah-Van Nuys Act, stated that damages
could be recovered,7 and in the same year, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit indicated that it would decide the same way if faced
squarely with the issue.8
In 1947, the Supreme Court of the United States, referring to the
Act, stated:
". .. any person who is injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden therein may sue and recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, in-
cluding a reasonable' attorney's fee." 9
Subsequent to this dictum, there has been a noticeable increase in litiga-
tion involving this section of the anti-trust laws.
In 1949, the federal courts decided favorably for the plaintiffs in
three cases on the question of whether damages would be recovered
under the Act, although no awards were actually made.10 In the fol-
lowing year, three courts again stated that damages were recoverable
are expressly given no private litigant can enforce laws of this character." 22
A. B. A. J. 593, 649 (1936). See also Hamilton and Loevinger, The Second
Attack On Price Discrimination: The Robinson-Patinan. Act, 22 WAsn. U. L. Q.
153, 182 (1937) ; Legislation, 50 HARv. L. Rav. 106, 121 (1936) ; Legislation, 85
U. PA. L. Rv. 306, 312 (1937).
" Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E. D. Tex. 1942). "It(section 13a) does not provide in express terms that persons injured by things
forbidden shall have a cause of action but by declaring them unlawful, the person
so injured, I think is entitled to invoke its provisions, if he can allege and prove
injury approximately caused by such violations."
' Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union, Inc. v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Co., 131 F. 2d 419, 422 (8th Cir. 1942). "Appellees also argue that section 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 USCA 13a, on which the third count of the com-
plaint is based, is a criminal act and not a part of the anti-trust laws within the
meaning of Section 7 of the Sherman Act, giving the right of action for dam-
ages in a civil suit .... There is authority to the contrary. Midland Oil Co. v.
Southern Refining Co., D. C., 41 F. Supp. 436; Kentucky-Tennessee L. &. P. Co.
v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728. But the question raised is not necessary
to this case, and we do not decide it."
Apparently, when the court cited the two cases above, it made the understand-
able mistake of confusing section 13(a) of Title 15, U. S. C. (Robinson-Patman
Act) with section 13a of Title 15, U. S. C. (Borah-Van Nuys Act).
' Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 743, 750 (1947).
"0 Two of these cases were dismissed because certain prerequisites to defendants'
liability were not shown. A. J. Goodman and Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg.
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949); Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice and Cold
Storage Co., 178 F. 2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949). In the third case, the defendant's
motion to dismiss was denied. Gordon, Wolf, Cowen Co. v. Independent Halvah
and Candies, Inc.. 9 F. R. D. 700 (S. D. N. Y. 1949).
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under the Act by the injured party.11 One court reasoned that
inasmuch as the Borah-Van Nuys Act attacked problems of monopoly
and competition in interstate commerce, it was therefore an anti-trust
law to which the treble damages provision of the anti-trust law applied.12
In Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,13 defendants, who sold
dairy products in the Pacific coast states, allegedly acted in concert to
reduce the wholesale price of their ice cream in the Los Angeles area
to an unreasonably low figure. Their motion to dismiss a suit for dam-
ages brought by local competitors was denied, the court stating that
".. . absent a specifically expressed contrary legislative intent . . ." a
civil action would lie for violation of the Borah-Van Nuys Amendment.1 4
Similar conclusions were reached by the federal courts sitting in
California and Illinois in 1951.15
Despite the trend in favor of civil liability under the Act at least one
tribunal has recently taken a contrary view. The District Court of the
District of Columbia, without passing on the question, stated, "The
court is inclined to the view that no action for damages or for an in-
junction is maintainable under the section in question."' 0
The majority appear to have construed the Borah-Van Nuys Act
correctly. The fact that it provides its own penalties does not of itself
preclude civil liability pursuant to other sections of the anti-trust laws.
The Sherman Act is also a criminal statute, imposing like penalties, 17
yet there is no doubt that treble damages can be recovered by parties
injured under it.'8 Section 4 of the Clayton Act,19 which provides for
treble damages, does not limit such awards to injuries resulting from
violations of the Clayton Act, but instead allows them for harm caused
by breaches of the "antitrust laws." Thus it is broad enough to include
the Borah-Van Nuys Act. The legislative history of the Act supports
"1Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184 F. 2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950); Balian Ice
Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (S. D. Cal. 1950); Spence v.
Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950).
"Spence v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950).
" 94 F. Supp. 796 (S. D. Cal. 1950).
14 Id. at 802.
"Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S. D. Cal. 1951) ; Hipps v. Bowman
Dairy Co., C. C. H. TRADE CASES REP. 62,859 (1950-51); F. and A. Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms, C. C. H. TRADE CASES RP. f162,848 (1950-51).
" National Used Car Market Report, Inc. v. National Auto Dealers Ass'n.,
108 F. Supp. 692, 694 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
"15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2 (1946).
18 Donovan and Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-trust Law, 63
N. 3. L. 3. 297 (1940).
'- 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1946). "Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
[Vol. 31
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the conclusion that an action for damages can be maintained under it.2
Although the Borah-Van Nuys Act was undoubtedly intended to be
used primarily as a criminal statute, indications are that it will not be




Approximately fifteen years have elapsed since the Chandler Act
became law and amended the Bankruptcy Act. That Act, in making
substantial changes to the partnership section, seems to have produced
a relative tranquility over the years in that area of the law. But while
the amended partnership section reconciled some earlier conflicts, it
left others to be decided by the courts. This would appear, therefore,
to be an alipropriate occasion to take cognizance of the existing law, its
development, and its conflicts.
Since a partnersip is not defined in the Bankruptcy Act,' its exist-.
ence in fact' must -depend upon the applicable state laws. A partner-
ship is generally looked upon as "an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."'3  In fact, this is the
precise definition under the Uniform Partnership Act.4 Every partner
is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business and the
acts of a partner in the ordinary course of the business binds the part-
nership and the partners. Also, partners are liable jointly for the debts
and obligations of the partnership, and liable jointly and severally for
a tort or breach of trust of another partner in the course of the partner-
ship business. Because of these ordinary principles of partnership law,
the "aggregate theory" is usually applied in describing the legal sig-
nificance of a partnership.
The Bankruptcy Act, however, does not strictly adhere to the
-°80 CONG. REc. 9420 (1936). "Mr. Hancock of New York: 'If a vendor is
found guilty of discrimination as provided in this 'bill (Borah-Van Nuys) is he
subject to the aggrieved party for damages or has he committed a crime and
subjected himself to penalty?' Mr. Celler: 'If he violates the Borah-Van Nuys
provision or other provision of the bill, he is subject to penalties of a criminal
nature and has committed an offense.' Mr. Hancock: 'Would he also be liable
for triple damages?' Mr. Celler: 'And he would also have to respond in triple
damages under the provisions of the Clayton Act. Anyone aggrieved can sue."
1A partnership is included within the meaning of the term "person" in the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 11 U. S. C. § 1(23) (1947).
- It must be proved that there is a partnership in fact and not a mere partner-
ship by estoppel, and the burden of such proof falls upon the petitioner. Buck-
ingham v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Fed. 192 (6th Cir. 1904).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. . 59-36 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
'Id. See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-37 (1943 Recomp. 1950) for rules in
determining the existence of a partnership.
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